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INTRODUcnON 
In two recent rulings, the United States Supreme Court estab­
lished new rules for managing risk and defending against sexual 
harassment claims and liabilities. In Faragher v. City of Boca Ra­
ton! and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,2 the High Court clari­
fied when employers are liable for sexual harassment committed by 
supervisors in the workplace. Significantly, these were only two of 
the four cases heard by the Supreme Court in the 1998 term regard­
ing sexual harassment. Within the four months prior to June 1998, 
the Court issued two other decisions, Gebser v. Lago Vista In­
dependent School District3 and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv­
ices, Inc. 4 Of the Court's thirty cases on the docket in 1998, four 
involved sexual harassment issues. 
In a society where sex is at the forefront of the news on an 
almost daily basis and is an integral part of the most popular televi­
sion series and movies, the tension between liberal societal attitudes 
on sex and appropriate workplace behavior poses a conundrum for 
employers. Providing a harassment-free workplace without being 
overly paternalistic has become an almost impossible challenge for 
many employers. 
Still, employers who fail to address the challenge of preventing 
* Steven D. Baderian and Elise Bloom are partners in the law firm of Jackson 
Lewis Schnitzler & Krupman, a national law firm exclusively dedicated to the represen­
tation of management in labor, employment, and benefits law and related litigation. 
Valerie K. Wilde is an associate of the firm's New York, New York office. While the 
information contained in this Article is believed to be accurate and authoritative, it is 
not intended as a substitute for specific legal, insurance, or other professional advice. 
1. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
2. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
3. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). 
4. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). 
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sexual harassment face extremely high stakes. Recently, a jury in 
Iowa awarded $80.7 million to a former manager of United Parcel 
Service after she alleged that the company fostered a sexually hos­
tile work environment and retaliated against her for complaining 
that a driver poked her breast.5 In another recent case, Astra 
U.S.A. agreed to pay $10 million to settle allegations of widespread 
sexual harassment in a consent decree negotiated with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").6 The allega­
tions specified that top management officials subjected female sales 
representatives to unwelcome touching and sexual comments.7 
Despite the potential magnitude of the consequences of sexual 
harassment, employers are not powerless. Indeed, it has become 
imperative for employers to undertake risk management and em­
ployee education and training programs. Included in such pro­
grams should be: (1) a basic overview of sexual harassment law; (2) 
a discussion of the four sexual harassment cases recently decided by 
the United States Supreme Court; and (3) an examination of the 
employer's preventive polices and strategies that are necessary to 
establish an affirmative defense under the new cases. 
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE LAW 
A. The Road to Faragher, Ellerth, and Oncale 
In its entire history, the United States Supreme Court has 
heard only six sexual harassment cases, four of which were heard in 
the 1998 term. Although sexual harassment issues comprise a sig­
nificant portion of employment discrimination litigation today, Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 was not originally drafted to 
protect individuals on the basis of sex. Rather, sex discrimination 
was added at the last minute as an attempt by opponents to defeat 
the bill. Much to their surprise, the amendment passed.9 Thus, 
there was no legislative history pertaining to discrimination based 
on sex under Title VII until almost a decade later, when it was 
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.10 
In the late 1970's two types of sexual harassment were first 
5. See Jordan Lite, Ex-UPS Manager Awarded $80M, AP ONLINE, Feb. 12, 1998. 
6. See EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., No. CIV.A. 98-40014, 1998 WL 80324, at *1 (D. 
Mass. Feb. 5, 1998); see also EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., No. CN.A. 98-40014-NMG, 
1999 WL 342043, at *1 (D. Mass. May 20, 1999). 
7. See Astra, 1998 WL 80324, at * 1. 
8. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994). 
9. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). 
10. PuB. L. No. 92-261, § 1, Mar. 24, 1972, 86 Stat. 103. 
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identified by the academic community: "quid pro quo" and "hostile 
environment."ll In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines specifying 
that sexual harassment, "whether or not it is directly linked to the 
grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where 'such conduct 
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an indi­
vidual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment,''' is prohibited under Title VII.12 
Interestingly, the terms "hostile environment" and "quid pro quo" 
do not appear in the text of Title VII. Nevertheless, these terms 
have been used to differentiate the types of misconduct for which 
employers are increasingly being held liable. 
1. The Birth of Sexual Harassment Law 
It was not until twelve years after the enactment of Title VII 
that a court first held that sexual harassment was actionable under 
the statute. In Williams v. Saxbe,13 the plaintiff sued her employer 
for sex discrimination under Title VII, alleging that she was termi­
nated after refusing a sexual advance made by her immediate su­
pervisor. The United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia held that conditioning job advancement on an em­
ployee's acquiescence to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimina­
tion and that the application of an employer's policy or practice on 
the basis of gender alone is sufficient to prove sex discrimination.14 
The court also held that a supervisor's imposition of conditions of 
sexual favors on female employees was tantamount to the employer 
doing the same, and that while Title VII is not concerned with mon­
itoring personal disputes between employees, it is intended to pro­
hibit discrimination in the workplace.1s 
One year after the Williams decision, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia also recognized quid pro 
quo harassment as a violation of Title VII. In Barnes v. Costie,16 
the court held that a supervisor who terminated an employee be­
cause she refused his sexual advances acted in violation of Title 
11. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264 (1998) (citing 
CATHERINE MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE 
OF DISCRIMINATION (1979». 
12. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (citing EEOC 
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985». 
13. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). 
14. See id. at 658-59. 
15. See id. at 660-61. 
16. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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VIIP The court, reversing the lower court's decision that the plain­
tiff "was discriminated against, not because she was a woman, but 
because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with her supervi­
sor," explained that the prohibition on discrimination based on sex 
is not limited to differences based on gender.18 Rather, it is only 
necessary that gender be a contributing factor to the 
discrimination.19 
Although most courts readily recognized quid pro quo harass­
ment as a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, it took 
another five years for a court to recognize hostile environment 
claims under Title VII. In Henson v. Dundee,2° the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied on the 1980 guide­
lines issued by the EEOC21 to hold that "[a] pattern of sexual har­
assment inflicted upon,an employee because of her sex is a pattern 
of behavior that inflicts disparate treatment upon a member of one 
sex with respect to terms, conditions or privileges of employ­
ment. "22 The court explained that a hostile or offensive atmos­
phere created by sexu~l harassment can, standing alone, constitute 
a violation of Title. VII.23 
In reaching this b.olding, the Henson court also relied upon 
Bundy v. Jackson.24 In Bundy, the District of Columbia Circuit 
held that sexual harassment claims can be established, even without 
tangible job detriment, where employees are subjected to a disctim~ 
inatory work environment.25 Although the Bundy court did'not use 
the term "hostile environment" in its discussion, the Henson court 
specifically focused on hostile work environment cases and laid out 
the elements necessary for a hostile environment claim: first, the 
employee must belong to a protected group; second, the employee 
17, See id, at 995, 
18, See ilL at 990, 
19, See id, 
20, 682 F,2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982), 
21. Through the issuance of its 1980 Guidelines, the EEOC stated its position 
regarding several issues, First, the EEOC acknowledged that sexual harassment is dis­
crimination based upon sex and is not limited to quid pro quo harassment Second, the 
EEOC recognized the hostile work environment theory of sexual harassment Third, 
the EEOC suggested that employers implement a sexual harassment policy, Fourth, the 
EEOC created the "knew/should have known" concept for establishing an employer's 
liability under the hostile environment theory. See EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Har­
assment, 29 C.F,R § 1604.11 (1997) (effective Nov. 10, 1980). 
22. Henson, 682 F.2d at 902. 
23. See id. 
24. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
25. See id. at 943. 
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must have been subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; third, the 
harassment must be based upon sex; and fourth, the harassment 
must have affected a "term, condition or privilege" of employ­
ment.26 The court emphasized that tangible economic harm is not 
necessary for the fourth element, but the alleged conduct "must be 
sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment 
and create an abusive working environment."27 
2. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 
By the early 1980's, most courts recognized quid pro quo and 
hostile environment sexual harassment claims. The Supreme 
Court, however, did not address sexual harassment until 1986 in the 
landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.28 
Although Meritor has often been cited for the proposition that 
an employer will be strictly liable for the quid pro quo sexual har­
assment of an employee by a supervisor,29 this language does not 
appear in the decision. The case itself dealt with employer liability 
for hostile environment claims premised on the actions of a supervi­
sor; however, implicit in the Court's discussion was the understand­
ing that under the EEOC guidelines employers may be strictly 
liable for quid pro quo harassment by supervisors.3o 
The plaintiff in Meritor alleged that she had been sexually 
harassed by her supervisor throughout her four years of employ­
ment.31 During that time, she had received several merit-based 
promotions.32 However, she was eventually terminated for exces­
sive use of sick leave, and she subsequently sued her employer for 
sexual harassment. 33 
In holding the employer liable for sexual harassment, the 
Supreme Court found that economic harm is not required for a 
plaintiff to assert a sexual harassment claim.34 Rather, the appro­
priate inquiry is whether the alleged conduct is "sufficiently severe 
or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment 
26. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-04. 
27. Id. at 904. 
28. 477 U.S. 57 (1986) 
29. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1997); Nichols v. 
Frank, 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994). 
30. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71-73. 
31. See id at 60. 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. at 67-68. 
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and create an abusive working environment.' "35 The Court also 
found that a plaintiff's admission that she submitted "voluntarily" 
to her supervisor's sexual overtures was not a defense to a sexual 
harassment suit.36 "The correct inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] by 
her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwel­
come."37 Finally, the Court held that an employer will not be 
strictly liable for a supervisor's conduct.38 In a cryptic discussion, 
the Court noted that the District of Columbia Circuit was incorrect 
in "concluding that employers are always automatically liable for 
sexual harassment [committed] by their supervisors," and added 
that simply because an employer has not received notice of harass­
ment "does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability."39 
Although the Supreme Court in Meritor recognized a hostile 
environment sexual harassment claim for the first time, it declined 
to offer a "definitive rule" on employer liability under TItle VII.40 
The federal courts of appeals, however, have consistently held that 
if a plaintiff establishes a quid pro quo41 claim, then the employer is 
vicariously liable.42 On the other hand, the courts have set forth 
various and sometimes conflicting standards for employer liability 
for hostile environment harassment perpetrated by supervisory 
employees.43 
3. The Aftermath of Meritor 
Following Meritor, the courts were faced with questions con­
cerning: (1) whether a plaintiff could prove quid pro quo sexual 
harassment where there was no tangible job detriment; (2) whether 
any circumstances existed that would warrant an employer's stric~ 
liability for a hostile work environment; (3) what conduct would be 
sufficiently severe to constitute a hostile working environment; and 
(4) what standards should be used to judge whether the conduct 
35. Id. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982». 
36. See id. at 68. 
37. Id. 
38. See id. at 72. 
39. Id. 
40. See id. 
41. To establish a quid pro quo claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) submission to 
unwelcome advances of a sexual nature was made an express or implied condition of 
receiving job benefits, or (2) rejection thereof resulted in job detriment. See EEOC 
Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997). 
42. See e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 
1989). 
43. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (1998). 
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created a sexually hostile working environment. One of the first 
issues that arose was determining when an employer "should have 
known" about allegedly pervasive sexually harassing conduct. Af­
. ter proving a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harass­
ment, most circuits required plaintiffs to carry the burden of 
establishing that the conduct which created the hostile environment 
should be imputed to the employer.44 Under this analysis, plaintiffs 
needed to prove that the employer either failed to provide a rea­
sonable avenue for a complaint or knew of the harassment but did 
nothing about it.45 Thus, an employer would not be liable if an ef­
fective anti-harassment policy existed and the employer investi­
gated the complaint in accordance with that policy. 
Subsequently the Second Circuit, in Karibian v. Columbia Uni­
versity,46 a decision often quoted as at odds with this analysis, held 
that the employer could be liable for sexual harassment, even if un­
reported, when the alleged harasser is a high-level executive.47 
However, the court did not provide a definition of high-level execu­
tive.48 The court determined that regardless of notice or the rea­
sonableness of complaint procedures, an employer would be liable 
if a supervisor used his actual or apparent authority to further the 
harassment, or if he was otherwise aided in accomplishing the har­
assment by the existence of the agency relationship.49 In an agency 
situation such as in Karibian, the identity of the supervisor and the 
employer merge, and the supervisor's knowledge is imputed to the 
employer, thereby rendering the employer liable for the supervi­
sor's conduct.50 If, however, the harasser had been a low level su­
pervisor who did not rely on his supervisory authority to carry out 
the harassment, the employer would not have been liable unless 
"'the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint 
or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.' "51 
Other circuits have adopted a more pro-employer approach to 
liability in sexual harassment cases. In Gary v. Long,52 the Circuit 
Court for the District of Columbia affirmed the dismissal of a plain­
44. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 
1992). 
45. See id. 
46. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994). 
47. See id. at 780. 
48. See id. 
49. See id. 
50. See id. 
51. Id. (quoting Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63). 
52. 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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tiff's Title VII claims against her employer on the grounds that an 
employer would escape liability for a supervisor's hostile work envi­
ronment harassment where the employer could show it had "imple­
mented measures such that the victimized employee either knew or 
should have known that the employer did not tolerate such conduct 
and that she could report it to the employer without fear of adverse 
consequences."53 The court, relying on general principles of agency 
law, reasoned that the anti-harassment policy should have reason­
ably put the plaintiff on notice that her supervisor's harassing con­
duct was in violation of the policy, and therefore was not authorized 
by the employer.54 Thus, the court held that the existence of an 
effective and publicized anti-harassment policy absolves an em­
ployer from Title VII liability.55 
4. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 
After Meritor and its progeny, it became evident that the lower 
courts needed additional guidance in determining what standards 
should be used to determine the existence of a sexually hostile work 
environment. For example, a number of courts began to modify the 
"reasonable person" standard for determining whether an environ­
ment was offensive.56 
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. ,57 the Supreme Courtclari­
fied the standard for determining when a hostile environment ex~ 
ists. This standard examines whether the conduct was both 
objectively hostile, meaning that a reasonable person would find it 
hostile, and subjectively hostile, meaning that the plaintiff found it 
hostile.58 The Court did not discuss the "reasonable woman" stan­
dard. The Court also clarified that a plaintiff need not suffer "tangi­
ble" or "economic" discrimination for a Title VII violation.59 
Specifically, a plaintiff who suffered psychological harm as a result 
53. Id. at 1398. 
54. See id. 
55. See id.; see also Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 
1994) (holding that an effective grievance procedure that is known to the employee and 
addresses the alleged harassment in a timely manner shields the employer from 
liability). 
56. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting the 
"reasonable woman" standard, which considers whether a reasonable woman would 
find that the accused's conduct was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi­
tions of employment and create an abusive working environment"). 
57. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
58. See id. at 19. 
59. See id. at 21. 
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of sexual harassment could still establish an actionable Title VII 
claim.60 However, while psychological harm would be relevant, it 
would not be required to establish a hostile environment claim.61 
After the Court's reaffirmation in Harris that "offensive" con­
duct should be viewed from the perspective of the reasonable per~ 
son, the next logical question was to determine the reasonableness 
of the employer's response. In a widely publicized decision, Torres 
v. Pisano,62 the Second Circuit considered the reasonableness of 
the employer's failure to investigate a sexual harassment claim 
where the victim requested that her complaint remain confidential. 
The court held that a supervisor's failure to report the sexual har­
assment of an employee by another supervisor was reasonable 
where the employee requested, verbally and in writing, on two sep­
arate occasions, that her complaint be kept confidential.63 The 
court cautioned, however, that "[t]here is certainly a point at which 
harassment becomes so severe that a reasonable employer simply 
cannot stand by, even if requested to do so by a terrified 
employee."64 
B. The Supreme Court's Recent Cases 
The courts have been split for over a decade on the applicable 
standards for employer liability in hostile environment cases. The 
Supreme Court finally addressed this issue in 1998 in two cases de~ 
cided on the same day. The holdings of these two cases, coupled 
with those of two other cases decided in 1997, will substantially 
change the landscape of sexual harassment law in the United States,
I 
1. Defining Employer Liability 
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton65 and Burlington Industries, 
60. See id. at 23. 
61. See id. 
62. 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 563 (1997). 
63. See id. at 639. 
64. Id. But see Gallagher V. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 348 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing 
grant of summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff, while reporting supervisor's 
sexually harassing conduct to human resources manager, told manager to handle the 
matter discreetly); WIXted V. DHL Airways, Inc., No. 95-C-2296, 1998 WL 164922, at 
*10 (N.D. III. Apr. 7, 1998) (holding that summary judgment was not proper where a 
jury could reasonably find that a supervisor's failure to report the sexual harassment of 
an employee by another supervisor, despite employee's request to keep the matter con­
fidential, was negligent where there were threats of serious physical harm to the victim 
if the employer did not act promptly). 
65. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
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Inc. v. Ellerth,66 the Supreme Court sanctioned the imposition of 
automatic employer liability where a supervisor engages in sexual 
misconduct and directly misuses his or her authority to discharge, 
demote, or cause the employee "tangible" job-related conse­
quences. In so doing, the Court held that when the offending con­
duct is by a supervisor, the employer's liability no longer turns on 
whether the alleged harassment is quid pro quo or hostile environ­
ment. Rather, the critical question is whether there was a tangible 
job detriment. If so, the employer is strictly liable. Where a super­
visor's sexually harassing misconduct does not cause tangible job­
related harm to the employee, the employer can avoid liability or 
reduce damages if it proves, as an affirmative defense, "(a) that the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive 
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 
harm otherwise. "67 
a. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,68 the plaintiff,· a sales 
representative, resigned after allegedly being subjected to repeated 
sexual advances by a mid-level manager. According to the plaintiff, 
the manager made sexual advances to her over a period of one year 
and told her that he "could make [her] life very hard or very easy at 
Burlington."69 Despite rebuffing his advances, she suffered no re­
taliation or adverse employment action.70 In fact, she was pro­
moted.71 Furthermore, even though she was familiar with the 
company's anti-harassment policy, the plaintiff never reported the 
harassment to management until after she resigned.72 Although the 
plaintiff allegedly suffered sexual harassment, the facts of her case 
made it difficult for her to frame a viable sexual harassment claim. 
She could not prove quid pro quo harassment because she never 
66. 118 s. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
67. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293. The distinction between eliminating liability or 
reducing damages, a question not answered by the High Court, is a significant one from 
a practical standpoint. Once there is a finding of liability, no matter how small, the 
employer is also liable for the plaintiffs attorneys fees, which in many cases can be 
substantial. 
68. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
69. Id. at 2262. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
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submitted to her supervisor's alleged advances, nor did she suffer a 
job detriment. Further, she could not establish a hostile environ­
ment claim because she could not prove her employer knew or 
should have known of the harassment. 
The question presented to the Court was whether a claim of 
quid pro quo sexual harassment is viable when the alleged harasser 
makes unfulfilled threats and no tangible employment action is 
taken against the employee. The Court, however, reframed the 
plaintiffs claim as a hostile work environment claim since it in­
volved only unfulfilled threats.73 It held that employers will be vi­
cariously liable for actionable hostile environments created by 
supervisors with immediate or successively higher authority over 
victimized employees.74 "When no tangible employment action is 
taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to 
liability or damages ...."75 This affirmative defense is the same 
one set forth in Faragher, requiring the employer to prove, first, 
that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior," and second, "that the plaintiff un­
reasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other­
wise."76 As in Faragher, the Court in Ellerth emphasized that no 
affirmative defense is available when the supervisor takes a tangible 
employment action against the employee.77 Because no tangible 
employment action was taken against the plaintiff, the Court re­
manded the case to give Burlington the opportunity to prove the 
affirmative defense.'8 
73. See id. at 2265. In reframing the plaintiff's claim as a hostile environment 
claim, the Court removed the plaintiff's lawyers' incentive to frame claims as quid pro 
quo claims so that the employers would be held to a vicarious liability standard. See id. 
at 2264-65. The Court explained that the labels "quid pro quo" and "hostile environ­
ment" are not controlling for purposes of employer liability. See id. at 2265. Rather, 
the inquiry relevant to employer liability is whether the supervisor took any tangible 
employment action against the employee. See id. The Court explained, however, that 
the terms are relevant "[t]o the extent that they illustrate the distinction between cases 
involving a threat which is carried out and offensive conduct in general ...." Id. 
74. See id. at 2270. The Court's analysis in both Ellerth and Faragher applied 
only to sexual harassment perpetrated by a supervisor. Accordingly, the standards for 
judging harassment perpetrated by a co-employee (i.e., was the harassment sufficiently 
severe or pervasive, did the employer know of the conduct and fail to reasonably re­
spond, should the employer have known about the conduct), remain unchanged. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. at 2271. 
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b. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,79 the plaintiff, a female life­
guard, sued the City of Boca Raton ("City") on a hostile environ­
ment claim. She alleged that her supervisors created a sexually 
hostile work environment by repeatedly subjecting her and other 
female lifeguards to uninvited and offensive touching and lewd and 
offensive remarks.80 Although she told another supervisor about 
the offensive behavior, the supervisor did not report the alleged 
misconduct to· his superiors.81 
Shortly before the plaintiff resigned, another female lifeguard 
wrote to the City's personnel director and complained about 
harassing conduct by the same supervisors.82 The City investigated 
the report and reprimanded the supervisors.83 Subsequently, even 
though the plaintiff had not complained to City officials, she filed 
suit claiming the City was liable for the harassment she allegedly 
suffered.84 
Thus in Faragher, the Supreme Court faced the issue of 
whether an employer could be liable for a first-line supervisor's sex­
ually harassing behavior of which it was not officially aware and 
which did not result in a tangible adverse employment action.85 Re­
lying on traditional agency principles, the Court sought to resolve 
the conflict between an employee's right to be free of sexual harass­
ment and the limits on employer liability for an "agent's" 
misconduct.86 
The Court held that while an employer is subject to vicarious 
liability for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervi­
sor with immediate or successively higher authority over the em­
ployee, the employer is allowed to present an affirmative defense 
when no tangible employment action is taken.87 The Court cited 
79. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
80. See id. at 2280. 
81. See id. at 2281. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. at 2280. 
85. In other words, the Court had to determine whether the City "should have 
known" about the conduct. 
86. See id. at 2282. 
87. See id. at 2292-93. Interestingly, as an appellate judge on the Court of Ap­
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Justice Scalia dissented from the court's en 
bane decision denying a rehearing of Vinson v. Taylor. See Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 
1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The 
dissenters rejected a standard of vicarious liability for a "supervisor's alleged sexual 
harassment when the employer was not even made aware of and given the chance to 
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discharge, demotion, and undesirable reassignment as' examples of 
tangible employment actions.88 
The Court found that the City's sexual harassment policy had 
never been effectively disseminated among the beach employees 
and the internal complaint procedure did not provide a mechanism 
for by-passing the offending supervisors.89 On that basis, the Court 
found that the City could not have exercised reasonable care to pre­
vent the harassing behavior as a matter of law and remanded the 
case to the district court for reinstatement of the judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff yo 
2. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District 
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,91 a case 
decided only a few days before Faragher and Ellerth; the Supreme 
Court limited a school district's liability for the alleged sexual har­
assment of a student by a teacher.92 The plaintiff, a high school 
student, had engaged in a sexual relationship with one of her teach­
ers.93 The relationship ended when a police officer discovered them 
having intercourse, and the district immediately terminated the 
teacher.94 The student had never reported the teacher's conduct 
while she maintained the sexual relationship with him, and there 
was no evidence that the district was aware of the relationship.95 
The plaintiff subsequently sued the school district under Title IX of 
rectify the consequences of the harassment alleged." [d. at 1333 (Bork, J., dissenting). 
In Faragher, Justice Scalia joined with Justice Thomas in dissent and once again ex­
pressed disapproval of vicarious liability in the absence of adverse employment action. 
See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2294 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justices Thomas and Scalia 
argued that an employer should not be held vicariously liable if a supervisor creates a 
hostile work environment absent an adverse employment consequence, for the same 
reason expressed in Scalia's dissent in Ellerth. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Under 
such circumstances, the untenable result would be that "employers will be liable 
notwithstanding the affirmative defense, even though they acted reasonably, so long as 
the plaintiff in question fulfilled her duty of reasonable care to avoid harm . . . . In 
practice, therefore, employer liability very well may be the rule." Id. (Thomas, J., dis­
senting) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2274 (1998) (citations 
omitted». 
88. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. The district court awarded the plaintiff one dollar in nominal damages 
on her TItle VII claim. See id. at 2281. 
91. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). 
92. See id. at 2000. 
93. See id. at 1993. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. at 1993-94. 
356 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:343 
the 1972 Education Amendments,96 which prohibits sex discrimina­
tion by educational institutions receiving federal financial 
assistance.97 
While the Supreme Court in the Faragher and Ellerth cases in­
creased the protection provided to employees against sexual harass­
ment in the workplace, ironically, it narrowed the protection 
provided to students at school. The Court in Gebser distinguished 
Title IX's implied private cause of action and lack of legislative his­
tory and Title VII's express private cause of action.98 The Court 
held that a school district would not be liable under Title IX for a 
teacher's sexual harassment of a student where the district did not 
have actual notice of the harassment and did not display deliberate 
indifference towards the harassment.99 
While it may seem that the Court's result in Gebser conflicts 
with its decisions in Faragher and Ellerth, Justice Ginsburg's dis­
senting opinion, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, foreshad­
owed the subsequent holdings of those cases by recognizing that an 
effective anti-harassment policy would be an affirmative defense.1oo 
At the same time, however, these three justices, along with Justice 
Stevens in a separate dissenting opinion, criticized the Court's hold­
ing and argued that "[a]s a matter of policy, the Court ranks protec­
tion of the school district's purse above the protection of immature 
high school students . . . . "101 
3. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 102 a case involv­
ing same-sex sexual harassment, is the only co-worker sexual har­
assment case that the Supreme Court has heard.103 In Oncale, a 
male employee brought a Title VII action against his former em­
ployer, a male supervisor, and two male co-workers, alleging that 
he had been sexually harassed.104 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged 
that he had been sexually assaulted by his supervisor and co-work­
96. PuB. L. No. 92-318, § 901, June 23,1972,86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended in 
20 V.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994». 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 1997-98. 
99. See id. at 2000. 
100. See id. at 2007 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
102. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). 
103. See id. 
104. See id. at 1001. 
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ers and threatened with homosexual rape.lOS Although the plaintiff 
had reported numerous incidents of harassment to supervisory per­
sonnel, no remedial action was ever taken.I06 The Supreme Court, 
in a unanimous opinion, held that sex discrimination consisting of 
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VIV07 
The Court allayed fears that liability for same-sex sexual har­
assment will transform Title VII into a "general civility code for the 
American workplace" by emphasizing that the crucial inquiry is still 
whether "members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous 
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other 
sex are not exposed."108 Thus, the standard under which sexual 
harassment cases are evaluated remains unchanged, regardless of 
whether one alleges same-sex sexual harassment or opposite-sex 
sexual harassment. The Court, however, did caution that careful 
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior oc­
curs is always required. For example: 
[A] professional football player's working environment is not se­
verely or pervasively abusive ... if the coach smacks him on the 
buttocks as he heads onto the field-even if the same behavior 
would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secre­
tary (male or female) back at the office.109 
In advising courts to examine the context of any alleged inap­
propriate behavior, the Court reaffirmed that actionable hostile en­
vironment claims will exist only where the conduct is severe or 
pervasive.u° This leaves room for courts to examine the alleged 
harasser's behavior, determine that the alleged conduct is not suffi­
ciently severe as a matter of law, and decide cases on summary 
judgment. 
Additionally, Oncale provides a uniform standard for lower 
courts regarding the viability of same-sex sexual harassment claims 
that previously did not exist. For example, prior to Oncale some 
jurisdictions, such as the Fourth Circuit, required the plaintiff to 
show that his harasser was homosexual,lll while the Fifth Circuit 
105. See id. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. at 1002. 
108. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
109. Id. at 1003. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. at 1002 (citing Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 
(4th Cir. 1996». 
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rejected all same-sex sexual harassment claims.112 By contrast, the 
Seventh Circuit held that sexual harassment was "always actiona­
ble, regardless of the harasser's sex, sexual orientation or motiva­
tions."113 With Oncale, the Supreme Court ensured that same-sex 
sexual harassment would be actionable under Title VII regardless 
of any of these considerations. 
C. 	 Post-Faragher and Ellerth: The Unanswered Questions 
The EEOC, as well as the courts, have consistently counseled 
employers about the need to promulgate policies prohibiting sexual 
harassment and providing effective complaint investigation proce­
dures. The Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher and Ellerth ele­
vate these basic precautions to a mandate, providing an affirmative 
defense for employers to avoid all liability where the harassing su­
pervisor's misconduct causes no tangible job-related harm to the 
employee and the employer proves both elements of the affirmative 
defense. The first element requires an employer to: (1) prevent 
and (2) promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior. The sec­
ond element requires the employer to prove that the employee: (1) 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportuni­
ties provided by the employer or (2) failed to avoid harm otherwise. 
Although the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher and El­
lerth provide some clarity in determining when an employer will be 
liable for its supervisors' misconduct, the decisions leave unresolved 
a number of questions for the lower courts to answer. These unan­
swered questions, in conjunction with the higher burden of proving 
the affirmative defense discussed above, will make it much more 
challenging for employers to win sexual harassment cases on sum­
mary judgment. 
1. 	 When is the Employer's Failure to Prevent Harassment 
Actionable? 
In applying the affirmative defense, it is difficult, if not impos­
sible, to determine whether an employer will be liable where it 
thoroughly investigates an employee's allegations that a supervisor 
created a hostile work environment and takes steps to end the of­
fending conduct. Imagine the following scenario. The employer 
112. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), 
rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). 
113. Doe ex rei. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 
118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998». 
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maintains a "zero tolerance" policy prohibiting sexual harassment. 
The employee appropriately follows the employer's guidelines on 
filing a sexual harassment complaint. Accordingly, the employer 
conducts a detailed investigation, follows up with the appropriate 
documentation of the incident(s), and takes disciplinary action, if 
necessary. No tangible adverse consequences have been taken 
against the employee. 
From these facts, it appears that both employer and employee 
have taken measures, to the best of .their ability, to prevent and 
correct any sexually harassing behavior. However, because the sec­
ond element of the affirmative defense set forth in Faragher and 
Ellerth requires that the employer prove that the employee did not 
"take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities pro­
vided by the employer," or failed to avoid harm otherwise, the de­
fense appears to be unavailable to the employer that did respond to 
an employee's complaint. Consequently, the employer will be lia­
ble for its supervisor's conduct, despite having followed the 
Supreme Court's mandate to prevent and promptly correct any sex­
ually harassing behavior. 
In this scenario, the employer finds itself in a conundrum. It is 
unclear whether an employer's prompt and thorough investigation 
of a sexual harassment complaint will serve as a bar to liability or 
simply be a means of reducing potential liability. Once the em­
ployer learns of an employee's sexual harassment complaint, the 
employer has little incentive to investigate the complaint if the em­
ployer will be liable regardless of its response. From a purely eco­
nomic standpoint, employers may wonder why they should 
terminate or discipline high-level executives or "rainmaking" super­
visors who have been accused of sexual harassment, if the ultimate 
outcome of the complaint will be that the employer is found liable 
regardless of its actions. 




As discussed earlier, an employer proves the second element of 
the affirmative defense by showing either that the employee failed 
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or that the employee failed to avoid 
harm otherwise. It is fairly easy to determine whether the em­
ployee took advantage of the employer's preventive or corrective 
opportunities. The employer need only ask such questions as 
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whether the employee complained about the harassment or 
whether the employee participated in a subsequent investigation. 
A more challenging question arises in determining whether the 
employee failed to avoid harm. It is precisely this question, how­
ever, that may provide an avenue for the employer to prove the 
employee did not meet his or her burden in preventing the sexual 
harassment.114 Moreover, the Court provided virtually no guidance 
regarding the circumstances under which an employee will be con­
sidered to have failed to avoid harm. The Court's only mention of 
this element of the affirmative defense consists of one sentence: 
[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding 
obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to 
showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure 
provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will 
normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the sec­
ond element of the defense.115 
The Court's discussion leaves open to interpretation what an em­
ployer must prove to satisfy the second element of the affirmative 
defense. 
3. What is a "Tangible Adverse Employment Action"? 
In the Ellerth case, the Supreme Court defined a tangible em­
ployment action as "a significant change in employment status, such 
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change 
in benefits."116 As the Court acknowledged, where an employee 
has not suffered direct economic harm, it is unlikely that the em­
ployer's behavior constitutes a tangible employment action.117 For 
example, in Crady v. Liberty National Bank & Trust CO.,118 the Sev­
enth Circuit found no adverse employment action where the branch 
manager of a bank was transferred to a collections officer position 
at another branch and retained the same salary and benefits.119 
114. For example, one possible scenario may exist where an employer's policy 
provides a number of supervisors to whom employees may report complaints of sexual 
harassment, but the employee fails to report the harassment to any of the listed 
supervisors. 
115. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998) (emphasis 
added). 
116. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268 (1998). 
117. See id. at 2269. 
118. 993 F.2d 132 (7th CiT. 1993). 
119. See id. at 135-36. 
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However, it should be noted that whether the employee suf­
fered direct economic harm may not be the only factor examined by 
a court in determining whether the employer took a tangible em­
ployment action against the employee. In Crady, the court ac­
knowledged that the unique circumstances of each case must be 
examined, including whether an employee's duties were "signifi­
cantly diminished" or an employee's title was changed to one that is 
"less distinguished."l20 Precisely such an assessment was made by 
the Sixth Circuit in Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc. 121 The 
court held that the plaintiff did not suffer a materially adverse em­
ployment action when she was transferred to a new position and 
her rate of pay and benefits did not change, her duties were not 
substantially modified, and she did not lose any prestige in her posi­
tion due to a change in working conditions or a change in title.122 
Conversely, other courts have found an adverse employment 
action regardless of the fact that the plaintiff did not suffer direct 
economic harm. In Collins v. Illinois,l23 the Seventh Circuit ex­
plained that "adverse job action is not limited solely to loss or re­
duction of payor money benefits," and held that a plaintiff who was 
transferred away from a job she enjoyed and was deprived of her 
office, telephone, and business cards suffered adverse action suffi­
cient to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII.124 Similarly, in 
Dahm V. Flynn,125 the Seventh Circuit, reversing summary judg­
ment for the defendant, held that demoting an employee from an 
"intellectually stimulating" job to a routine job, even without a loss 
in benefits or salary, may constitute adverse employment action.126 
Clearly, courts have been forced to consider what constitutes a 
tangible adverse employment action. At least one commentator 
has stated that future litigation will focus on the situation where an 
employee believes his or her "status" has been diminished as a re­
sult of some employment action taken by the employer.127 Given 
120. See id. at 136. 
121. 97 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1996). 
122. See id. at 886-87. 
123. 830 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1987). 
124. See id. at 703-04 (emphasis added). 
125. 60 F.3d 253 (7th Cir. 1994). 
126. See id. at 257; see also McGrenaghan v. Saint Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 
326 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that a job transfer with significantly diminished responsi­
bility constitutes adverse job action even though there was no change in salary or 
benefits). 
127. See Dominic Bencivenga, Looking For Guidance, High Court Rulings Leave 
Key Terms Undefined, 220 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1998). 
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the Supreme Court's failure to provide a framework for what con­
stitutes a tangible adverse employment action, substantial litigation 
regarding this issue will certainly arise. 
4. 	 In What Contexts Will the Affirmative Defense be 
Applied in the Future? 
Nowhere in Faragher and Ellerth did the Supreme Court limit 
the application of the affirmative defense to sexually hostile work 
environments. The Court specifically stated that "[a]n employer is 
subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an action­
able hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate 
(or successively higher) authority over the employee."128 Conceiva­
bly, the affirmative defense is available whenever a plaintiff alleges 
a hostile work environment perpetrated by a supervisor, whether 
that environment is the result of discrimination based on the indi­
vidual's race, religion, national origin, sex, color, age, or disability. 
Since the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, many courts have had 
the opportunity to apply the affirmative defense to hostile environ­
ment claims. In Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue,129 the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the 
affirmative defense to a claim brought by an employee who alleged 
a hostile environment based upon his national origin. The em­
ployee, who was terminated for petty embezzlement, sued the com­
pany for national origin discrimination based upon his allegations 
that a supervisor had made derogatory comments about his na­
tional origin (Italian American) and the national origin of his wife 
(Hispanic)PO At trial, the plaintiff testified that he never com­
plained about these comments because he was" 'afraid of repercus­
sions'" and believed that filing a complaint would only bring about 
an '" [un]pleasCl.nt outcome.' "131 
In granting summary judgment to the employer, Judge Brieant, 
writing for the court, stated that an employee's fear of repercus­
sions or conflict does not excuse the employee from making full use 
of an employer's complaint procedures.132 Focusing on the second 
element of the affirmative defense, which requires that the em­
ployer prove the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage 
128. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998) (emphasis 
added). 
129. 13 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
130. See id. at 485-86. 
131. Id. at 487. 
132. See id. at 492. 
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of its complaint procedures, the court emphasized that employees 
must accept responsibility for reporting harassment because em­
ployers cannot combat harassment of which they are not aware.133 
Interestingly, it appears that fear of retaliation may not excuse 
an employee from failing to follow an employer's complaint proce­
dures, even where the supervisor threatens to terminate the em­
ployee for reporting the discriminatory conduct. For instance, in 
Sconce v. Tandy Corp. ,134 the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Kentucky applied the affirmative defense and 
found the employer not liable where an employee who alleged hos­
tile environment sexual harassment never reported her supervisor's 
behavior to the employer .135 
In Sconce, the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor groped her, 
made sexual innuendos, and threatened to terminate her if she told 
anyone.136 She refused his advances; and although she was aware 
of the employer's policy against sexual harassment, she failed to file 
a complaint in accordance with that policy, and instead requested a 
transfer to a lower paying position at another location.137 Applying 
the affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth, the court found that the 
employer's comprehensive policy against sexual harassment, com­
bined with the employee's failure to report the harassment, pre­




8 Like the court in Fierro, the Sconce court stated that 
an employee's fear of retaliation does not excuse his or her failure 
to follow the employer's procedures for filing a sexual harassment 
complaint. The court stated, "[A] threat of termination, without 
more, is not enough to excuse an employee from following proce­
dures adopted for her protection. To hold otherwise would render 
the affirmative defense meaningless. "139 
The plaintiff in Sconce also alleged quid pro quo sexual harass­
ment.140 However, because the plaintiff never submitted to her su­
pervisor's alleged sexual demands, was never denied a promotion, 
and voluntarily requested a transfer, the employer had not taken 
any specific job action against the employee and was not held 
133. See id. 
134. 9 F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D. Ky. 1998). 
135. See id. at 778. 
136. See id. at 775. 
137. See id. 
138. See id. at 777-78. 
139. Id. at 778. 
140. See id. at 775. 
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strictly liable.141 Other courts which have addressed sexual harass­
ment claims since the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher and 
Ellerth have similarly denied employers' motions for summary 
judgment.142 
II. THE KEY TO AVOIDING LIABILITY: PREVENTIVE POLICIES 

AND TRAINING FOR MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS143 

A. Two Critical Words: Prevention and Response 
In the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, the Supreme Court is­
sued two clear mandates to employers. First, take immediate, bold, 
and continuing steps to prevent harassment from occurring. Pre­
vention is the only "no liability" option since any tangible adverse 
employment action flowing from harassment automatically results 
in liability for the employer. Second, use prompt "reasonable care" 
to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior. If an em­
ployer does so and an employee unreasonably fails to_take advan­
tage of those preventive or corrective opportunities, an employer 
will not be liable for the harassment absent tangible adverse em­
ployment action. Consequently, an employer's efforts at preven­
tion and response are critical. 
B. Ten Steps to Take Immediately 
To enhance their ability to prevent sexual harassment claims 
and to maximize the likelihood of an effective response to a com­
plaint, employers should consider implementing the following 
workplace measures:144 
141. See id. at 775-76. 
142. See Alverio v. Sam's Warehouse Club, 9 F. Supp. 2d 955, 961 (N.D. 111. 1998) 
(denying defendant's summary judgment motion and holding defendant vicariously lia­
ble for the sexually hostile environment created by one of its supervisors but stating 
that defendant may raise the affirmative defense as to liability or damages); Hill v. 
Gateway Reg'l Health Sys., No. 97-CA-1130-MR, 1998 WL 412623, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. 
July 24, 1998) (holding that supervisor's conduct, consisting of at least twelve offensive 
comments over a period of fourteen months, could rise to the level of a sexually hostile 
work environment and remanding for defendant to raise affirmative defense at trial). 
143. The following discussion is borrowed from The Jackson Lewis Ten Step 
Response to the New Rules on Workplace Sexual Harassment ("Jackson Lewis Ten 
Step Response"), with the permission of Jackson Lewis Schnitzler & Krupman. 
144. The Jackson Lewis Ten Step Response is not an exhaustive list. Because all 
items on this list may not be appropriate for every employer, each sexual harassment 
program should be tailored to the employer's culture and resources. 
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1. 	 Review Your Sexual Harassment and Anti-Retaliation 
Policy 
A strong sexual harassment policy is the linchpin in the preven­
tion and defense of sexual harassment claims. The policy should be 
written in plain language-defining the types of conduct which po­
tentially violate the policy and stating that sexual harassment and 
retaliation for complaints of harassment are prohibited and will not 
be tolerated by the employer. To develop an effective policy, an 
employer should consider incorporating some, if not all, of the fol­
lowing suggestions: 
• offer examples of potentially violative conduct with statements 
that the examples are not intended to be all-inclusive; 
• provide employees with convenient and reliable mechanisms for 
reporting incidents of sexual harassment and retaliation and for 
participating in related investigations; 
• post the name, work location, and telephone number of employer 
representatives-both male and female-to whom employees are 
to make complaints of harassment and retaliation; 
• 	ensure that at least one employer representative is at the em­
ployer's facility whenever it is in operation; 
• encourage employees to report incidents promptly either verbally 
or in writing; 
• provide 	a timetable for reporting harassment, beginning and 
completing an investigation, and responding to a complaint; 
• inform employees of the potential consequences of failing to take 
advantage of the employer's preventive or corrective 
opportunities; 
• inform employees-supervisors 	and non-supervisors alike-of 
disciplinary action that may be taken if they are found to have 
violated the employer's policy. 
2. 	 Identify All Supervisors and Make Them Accountable 
for Compliance with the Employer's Sexual 
Harassment and Anti-Retaliation Policy 
The Supreme Court held that employers are liable when a "su­
pervisor" harasses an employee over whom the supervisor has im­
mediate (or successively higher) authority. Take steps immediately 
so that the employer, rather than a jury, determines who is and who 
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is not a "supervisor." Include "commitment to equal employment 
opportunity" as a qualification for every supervisory position . 
... ,3.. rrain All Supervisors on Sexual Harassment Prevention, 
To take advantage of the Supreme Court's new affirmative de­
fense, an employer must prove that it took "reasonable care" to 
prevent harassment and to promptly correct any sexually harassing 
behavior. Providing effective sexual harassment prevention train­
ing for all supervisors enhances an employer's ability to take advan­
tage of this defense. Additionally, effective training will increase 
the likelihood that a supervisor will not engage in sexually harassing 
conduct in the first place and will respond appropriately to a com­
plaint of harassment. All supervisors should be required to attend 
s'uch training. To emphasize its importance, a senior manager 
should introduce the training. 
4. 	 Train' Non-SuperVisory Employees on the Sexual 
Harassment Policy and the Procedures to Follow 
if They Experience Sexual Harassment 
By educating non-supervisory employees, an employer 
breathes life into its sexual harassment prevention policy. The 
training further enhances an employer's ability to establish that it 
took reasonable steps necessary to prevent sexually harassing be­
havior. It also can help establish that an aggrieved individual un­
reasonably failed to take advantage of the employer's preventive 
and corrective opportunities. 
5. 	 Obtain a Signed Receipt When Distributing the Sexual. 
Harassment Policy 
Soinetimes an employee does not remember, or denies recelv­
ing a copy of a sexual harassment prevention policy. As a result, a 
jury must det~rmine whether the employer actually communicated 
the policy. To remove any doubt about dissemination of the policy, 
an employer should obtain and retain a signed receipt from every 
employee to whom the employer distributes a sexual harassment 
prevention policy. 
6. 	 Peri'odically Redistribute the Sexual Harassment Policy 
and Obtain Updated Receipts 
Remind employees periodically of the employer's policy 
prohibiting sexual harassment by redistributing the policy and ob­
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tain a receipt each time. This should be done at least annually. By 
showing that the employee must have been aware of the policy, the 
employer enhances its ability to prove that an employee unreasona­
bly failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective meas .. 
ures provided by the employer. . 
7. 	 Instruct Appropriate Managers on the Guidelines for 
Conducting Investigations of Sexual Harassment 
Complaints 
While it is unlikely that an employer can prevent all conduct 
which might give rise to a complaint of sexual harassment, in some 
cases an employer may avoid liability if it promptly and effectively 
investigates the harassment complaint. Because investigations into 
allegations of sexual harassment are often difficult, an employer 
should give managers who are responsible for conducting and doc\.l­
menting such investigations as much guidance as possible before 
complaints are filed. However, an employer should make all man,. 
agers responsible for notifying human resources or the general 
counsel if any allegations are brought to their attention and warn 
supervisors that disciplinary action will be taken if a supervisor fails 
to do so. 
8. 	 Incorporate the Sexual Harassment Policy into New 
Employee Orientation 
With each new hire, an employer has an opportunity to estab­
lish a record of taking reasonable care to prevent sexual harass­
ment. By distributing the policy and incorporating sexuai 
harassment prevention into new employees' orientation programs, 
employers may reduce sexual harassment claims and strengthen 
their defenses if such claims are brought. 
9. 	 Document Efforts to Prevent and Correct Harassment 
and Any Employee's Failure to Take Advantage of 
the Opportunities Provided by the Employer 
An employer can eliminate disputes about its efforts to prevent 
and respond to sexual harassment claims by documenting those ef­
forts. An employer should keep a complete record of its preventive 
programs, publications to. employees, training for managers and 
employees, all complaints received and investigated, and any 
r~mediation efforts taken. It would also serve the employer's best 
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interests to document any failure by an employee to take advantage 
of the corrective opportunities provided by the employer. 
10. 	 Assert the New Affirmative Defense in Pending or 
Future Sexual Harassment Lawsuits 
While the Supreme Court's decision provides employers with a 
new defense for sexual harassment claims, employers must affirma­
tively present and prove it. Employers should take steps to ensure 
that all pending sexual harassment litigation is reviewed immedi­
ately to determine whether this affirmative defense, if available, has 
been presented and pursued. Amending court papers or requesting 
additional discovery may be appropriate. Also, it may be beneficial 
for an employer to consider raising this defense in other types of 
employment discrimination cases, especially those involving 
harassment. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent Supreme Court cases have resolved a number of ques­
tions regarding the law of sexual harassment. Employers must take 
definite action to ensure that they can utilize the new affirmative 
defense to employer liability. The Supreme Court has made it clear 
that employers must adopt preventative policies and strategies if 
they are to avoid the significant risks posed by sexual harassment 
claims. 
